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The paper aims at empirically investigating the relationship between regulation and the capital 
structure of the regulated firm, A key aspect of the referred relationship pertains a leverage 
effect according to which debt could be increased as a response to previous physical capital 
investment with an ultimate goal of inducing higher rates. Theoretical models like Spiegel and 
Spulber [1997, RAND Journal of Economics] highlight that effect. The present paper 
considers a panel data set of local exchange carriers-LECs in the U.S. and investigate Granger 
causality between changes in long-term debt (NDEBT) and gross investment (INV) in 
physical capital. The evidence accruing from a dynamic panel data estimation indicates an 
uni-directional causality from INV to NDEBT and therefore is, to a large extent, consistent 
with a leverage effect and with the notion that the size of the firm´s investment project can 
impose a restriction on the amount of new debt. The result prevails independent of a control 
variable that indicates the regulatory regime. 
JEL Code: G32, L51, L96. 
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     A relatively small body of literature has emerged in terms of empirical 
studies  on  the  incentive  properties  of  different  regulatory  regimes.  In  the 
context of telecommunications, salient aspects include the  assessment of 
productive efficiency as given, for example, by Majumdar (1997), Resende 
(1999, 2000) and Uri (2001) and studies on service-quality that include Ai 
and  Sappington  (2002),  Banerjee  (2003),  and  Resende  and  Façanha 
(2005). The actual regulatory practice mostly revealed a gradual substitution 
of traditional rate-of-return regulation by regimes involving earnings sharing 
or  price  caps.  The  evidence,  however,  is  mixed  in  what  concerns  the 
different incentive properties of the different regulatory regimes [see Kridel et 
al. (1996) and Sappington (2002) for an overview of the related issues and 
earlier empirical works]. 
  A different regulatory aspect referring to the impact on capital structure has 
received  scarce  empirical  attention  in  the  literature.  Bradley  et  al.  (1984) 
have obtained evidence that regulated industries would appear among the 
most  leveraged  sectors  but  the  bulk  on  the  literature  concentrates  in  the 
theoretical  front,  and  studies  by  Spiegel  (1994,  1996)  and  Spiegel  and 
Spulber (1994, 1997) pinpointed the possible relevance of  a leverage effect 
according to which firm could induce higher rates by the regulator. In fact, by 
becoming more leveraged the regulated firm can induce  a more favorable 
rate setting by the regulator who wants to avoid risks of bankrupcy following 
expressive previous investments in physical capital. Philips (1988) suggests 
that  the  phenomenon  appears  to  be  empirically  relevant  but  a  clear 
quantittave investigation is still lacking in the literature.     The  present  paper  aims  at  providing  an  initial  exploratory  effort  in 
connection  to    the  investigation  of  the  leverage  effect.  For  that  purpose, 
Granger causality tests between changes in debt and investment in physical 
capital are conducted for  a panel of local exchange carriers-LECs. 
The  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  The  second  section  discusses  some 
conceptual  aspects  referring  to  the  relationship  between  regulation  and 
capital  structure  and  presents  the  basic  aspects  of  the  econometric 
framework.  The  third  section  discusses  the  construction  of  the  data  and 
presents the empirical results for the dynamic panel data empirical model. 
The fourth section brings some final comments. 
 
2.  Regulation and Capital Structure 
2.1- Conceptual aspects 
 The  strategic  interaction  between  the  regulator  and  the  regulated  firm  is 
complex  in  the  context  of  the  latter  capital  structure.  A  central  aspect 
pertains the relevance of a leverage effect that had already been highlighted 
by the theoretical literature by Spiegel (1994, 1996) and Spiegel and Spulber 
(1994) in the case of symmetric information between the parts. The logic of 
the  leverage  effect  is  that  the  regulated  firm  could  have  an  incentive  to 
become leveraged and ultimately induce a more favorable rate setting by the 
regulator,  whereas the  latter  would  be  willing to  accomadate to  a certain 
extent to avoid the possibility of bankruptcy by the firm. 
   The aforementioned strategic relationship becomes even more complex in 
the  presence  of  asymmetric  information  between  the  regulator  and  the 
regulated firm. Spiegel and Spulber (1997) advance a sequential model that 
partially  builds  on  Banks  (1992)  and  Besanko  and  Spulber  (1992)  that highlights the limited commitment ability by the regulator that is captured by 
taking the regulated firm as the first mover. The three stages game begins 
with the regulated firm choosing the capital structure  in terms  of the mix 
between  debt  and  equity  to  outside  investors  that  will  provide  funds  for 
investment in physical capital. In the second stage, the prices of the firms 
securities  will  be  defined  in  the  capital  market  and  will  also  reflect 
expectations associated to the future regulatory policy. In the third stage, the 
regulator  will  set  the  rates  in  acordance  with  some  welfare  maximization 
criterion that considers consumer surplus and profits. 
 In addition to the leverage effect, the asymmetric information context brings  
a  complex  signallling  problem  as  there  are  two  receivers  (regulator  and 
outside investors) for which the firm has conflicting incentives. In fact, the 
firm  would  like  to  send  a  positive  signal  to  the  capital  market  so  as  to 
indicate  low  expected  costs  to  the  outside  investors  and  good  profits 
prospects but also would be willing to signal high costs to the regulator so as 
to induce higher rates. Possible equilibria will reflect those various aspects. 
The  present  paper intends to conduct  an initial  empirical investigation  on 
aspects favouring the fists aspect of the problem namely that of the leverage 
effect,  but  of  course  the  theoretical  literature  warrants  a  far  deeper 
investigation in the future. 
 
2.2- Econometric framework 
     The present application will consider a panel of firms and verify whether 
there is evidence that new debt is caused by gross investment in physical 
capital.  A  dynamic  panel  data  structure  will  preclude  the  utilization  of 
traditional panel data estimators given well known biases [for and overview of  consistent  and  efficient  estimators  for  dynamic  panel  data  see  Baltagi 
(2001) and Bond (2002)].  
    A simple dynamic model for is given by: 
) 1 ( 1 , it i it t i it v x y y + + + = − µ β α  
The  model  could  also  include  time  effects  ( t λ )  that  would  capture  non-
observed heterogeneities that only depend on the time period and typically 
are considered by means of period dummy variables. The lagged dependent 
variable induces significant biases in traditional panel data estimators and 
therefore Arellano and Bond-AB (1991) have suggested a  consistent and 
efficient  estimator  for  short  panels  based  on  the  first  difference  of  the 
dynamic model. The estimator is generalized method of moment estimator 
that  uses  orthogonality  condition  on  the  appropriate  instruments  and  the 
error (henceforth GMM-DIF). The first differencing of expression (1) would 
readily lead to: 
) 2 ( 1 , it it t i it v x y y ∆ + ∆ + ∆ = ∆ − β α  
The lag structure of the equation in differences will reflect the chosen lag 
structure  of  the  equation  in  levels.  The  first-differencing  transformation 
therefore  eliminates  the  fixed  effect.  It  can  be  verified  that  appropriate 
instruments  for    1 , − ∆ t i y   ,  in  terms  of  lagged  dependent  variable  in  levels, 
become increasingly available starting with yi1 at  T=3, yi1 and yi2 at T=4 up 
to yi1, ..., yi,T-2 for T. The remaining elements of the instrument matrix will 
depend  on  the  assumptions  regarding  additional  regressors  xit.  In  the 
simplest  case  where  they  are  assumed  to  be  strictly  exogenous 
(uncorrelated  with  past,  current  and  future  errors)  the  variables  can  be 
readily  used  as  instruments  whereas  in  the    case  of  endogeneity,  an instrumenting procedure with lagged variables in levels that is analogous to 
the  previous  procedure  would  be  implemented.  The  validity  of  the 
instruments  is  important  for  the  consistency  of  the  GMM-DIF  estimator. 
Sargan´s test for overidentifying restrictions in terms of  the joint significance 
of the instruments in excess to the minimum necessary for identification and 
would be distributed as  a chi-square with the number of degrees of freedom 
given by the difference between the number of instruments and the number 
of endogenous variables, under the null hypothesis. Additionally, even in the 
absence  of  serial  correlation  for  the  model  in  levels,  the  first-differencing 
procedure  would  induce  first-order  serial  correlation  but  not  second-order 
serial correlation. Tests for AR(1) and AR(2) were suggested by AB and the 
latter is important to assure adequate properties to the estimator. Under the 
null  hypothesis  of  no  serial  correlation,  the  test  statistics  would  follow  a 
standard normal distribution. 
    The focus of the paper will be on tests for Granger causality. The concept 
is  largely  widespread  since  Granger  (1969).  Let  x  and  y  denote  two 
stationary stochastic processes, x is said to Granger cause y if the inclusion 
of  past  values  of  x  help  to  explain  y  by  reducing  the  variance  of  the 
prediction error, that is: 




− − − < t t t t t y y x y y σ σ  
Applications  for  time  series  became  routine  whereas  applications  for 
dynamic panels data are becoming increasingly common as exemplified by 
Banerjee (2003) in the context of regulation. In operational terms, one runs  
a regression of y on past values of y and past values of x, and x would 
cause  y  if  one  obtains  jointly  significant  coefficients  for  the  lagged  x 
variables.  A  causality  in  the  opposite  direction  would,  of  course,  be evaluated in terms of the reverse regression and assessment of the joint 
significance of lagged y variables. In the context of the present GMM-DIF 
application, Wald type tests will be conducted. 
 
3.  Empirical Analysis 
3.1- Data Sources 
  The  paper  relies  on  different  data  sources.  First,  the  data  on  debt  and 
physical  investment  are  obtained  from  the  annual  report  given  by  the 
Statistics  of  Communication  Common  Carriers  from  the  Federal 
Communications  Commission-FCC.  In  fact,  that  is  a  traditional  and 
comprehensive source for accounting and plant data for U.S. local exchange 
carriers-LECs.  A consistent balanced panel was constructed so as to avoid 
merging problems. The final sample comprised 31 firms that are listed in the 
appendix. The data construction can be summarized as follows: 
. NDEB: defined by the change in long-term debt, where the values were 
deflated  by  the  telecommunications  implicit  price  deflator  [1996=100, 
provided by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis]. Excluding the possibility 
of  debt  renegotiations,  the  change  in  long-term  debt  appears  to  be  a 
sensible  approximation to the change of debt more connected with physical 
capital changes; 
. INV: defined by the change in physical capital as indicated by the change in 
gross  communication  plant.  In  the  deflating  procedure,  an  average  of  the 
telecommunications  implicit  price  deflator  [1996=100,  provided  by  the  U.S. 
Bureau  of  Economic  Analysis]  was  considered.  The  averaging  process 
intends to account for the presence of different capital vintages coexisting in a given time. The time horizon for the calculated average was set in 10 years 
The weighting scheme considers geometrically declining weights given by  
(1-δA)  where  δA  stands  for  the  average  (across  time  and  firms)  of  the 
depreciation  rate  (depreciation  expenses  divided  by  communication  plant). 


































. REG: indicates the proportion of the firm´s activities that is subject to price 
cap  regulation.  The  state  level  information  on  regulatory  regimes  was 
obtained  from  Abel  and  Clements  (1998).  In  order  to  obtain  firm-level 
variables in the case of LECs operating in different states, I made use of the 
number  of  local  loops  for  the  firms  at  state  level  as  provided  by  the 
Monitoring  Report-FCC.  That  information  allowed  to  generate  state-level 
weights. The procedure had been used by Resende and Façanha (2005) 
and is used  here for  some additional  LECs. The  information  provided  by 
Abel and Clements (1998) that served as the basis of the construction of 
REG led to the focus on the sample period of 1989-1998 after constructing 
the aforementioned variables defined in term of first-differences.  
    The analysis of the U.S. local telephony provides an important potential for 
comparing regulatory regimes that are mostly defined at the state level. 
2  
In  the  present  application,  the  possibility  of  controlling  for  the  regulatory 
regime can be interesting given that the more strict controls that prevail under 
                                                
1  A similar procedure was considered by Resende (1999). However, the focus of the analysis of 
the present paper is on changes in  gross communication plant as one wants to investigate 
whether changes in debt are induced by changes in physical capital of whatever nature even if it 
involves replacements associated to depreciation. 
2  Previously explored in terms of the construction of a regulatory regime variable as in Resende 
(1999, 2000) and Resende and Façanha (2005) rate-of-return could, in principle, induce different impacts on capital structure. 
The reasons for the chosen sample period  
a)  Detailed information on regulatory regimes are only available until 1998 
as provided by Abel and Clements (1998); 
b)  The  Telecommunications  Act  of  1996  and  the  growing  penetration  of 
VoIP delineates  a more competitive environment a few years after; 
c)  The  contrast  between  regulatory  regimes  becomes  less  evident  over 
time as price-cap regimes gradually prevail; 
d)  After  1998  the  coverage  of  the  referred  FCC  report  displays  some 
reduction  as  some  smaller  LECs  no  longer  reported  data  in  that 
publication and also one observes the decline of total access lines in the 
case of some LECs what may reflect the possibility that traditional fixed 
telephony becomes growingly subject of alternative competition 
  Altogether, the sample period of 1989-1998 appears as especially relevant 
for establishing suitable controls for the regulatory regime prevailing at the 
state level. 
 
3.2- Empirical Results 
 Tables 1 and 2 present the estimation results for the GMM-DIF model. The 
results were obtained with the software DPD 1.21 that runs in the platform 
Ox  3.0.    In  order  to  ascertain  desirable  properties  for  the  estimator  one 
needs  to  verify  the  validity  of  the  chosen  instruments  in  terms  of  the 
overidentifying Sargan´s test. The test assesses the joint significance of the 
instruments  in  excess  to  the  minimum  necessary  for  identification.  As 
mentioned before, valid instruments would become increasingly available in 
terms of level lagged values starting at lag 2 and including subsequent lags. In  the  present  application,  lagged  levels  for  ∆NDEB  and  ∆INV  are 
considered  for  t-2  until    t-4  as  instruments  as  well  as  the  constant,  time 
dummies  (D94,  ...,  D98)  whenever  available,  and  the  regulatory  regime 
variable ∆REG. Moreover, the parcimonious choice of the lag structure (at 
most  p  =  4)  reflected  the  relatively  limited  number  of  time  periods.  The 
evidence, in  all cases, favored the non-rejection of the null hypothesis of 
Sargan´s test and therefore favors the validity of the chosen instruments.  
  Moreover,  an  important  diagnostic  pertains  the  assessment  of  the 
presence of second order serial correlation in the error term. In fact, even in 
the absence of serial correlation in the level model, first-differencing would 
induce first-order serial correlation but not second-order serial correlation. 
That  property  is  important  to  guarantee  the  consistency  of  the  GMM-DIF 
estimator.  In  all  cases,  the  corresponding  tests  are  satisfactory  and  one 
cannot  reject  the  null  hypothesis  of  the  absence  of  second-order  serial 
correlation.  
    Even though the analysis of specific coefficients is not the focus of the 
analysis, it is possible to highlight some salient results. First, the regulatory 
regime variable as given by ∆REG does not exert any significant effect as  a 
control  in  the  dynamic  relationships  that  include  ∆NDEBT  and  ∆INV.  In 
principle, could be the case that  a leverage effect could be more likely to 
prevail  under  rate-of-return  regulation  where  strategic  behavior  by  the 
regulated  firm  could  more  clearly  influence  rate-setting.  However,  even 
under  light-handed  price-cap  regulation  the  setting  of  lower  productivity 
offset  factor  X  could  in  principle  reflect,  to  some  extent,  concerns  for 
bankrupcy    in  leveraged  contexts  that  extrapolate  expected  productivity 
gains.   Second,  the  coefficients  of  time  dummies  are  often  not  statiscally 
significant when considered individually.  
Table 1 
Causality analysis INV → NDEBT: results from GMM-DIF estimation 
 
Dependent variable: ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆NDEBT  Regressors 
p=1  p=2  p=3  p=4 


























∆ ∆ ∆ ∆NDEBT-4  -  -  -  -0.351 
(0.848) 


















∆ ∆ ∆ ∆INV-4  -  -  -  -0.351 
(0.848) 








D1992  20883.5 
(0.627) 
-  -  - 




-  - 







































         
Sargan test   χ
2(39) =18.68 
       (0.998) 
χ
2(31) = 18.35  
             (0.991) 
χ
2(29) = 23.50   
            (0.753) 
χ
2(21) = 15.78  
             (0.782) 
















 Table 2 
Causality analysis NDEBT → INV: results from GMM-DIF estimation 
 
Dependent variable: ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆INV  Regressors 
p=1  p=2  p=3  p=4 
Constant  7187.11  

























∆ ∆ ∆ ∆INV-4  -  -  -  -0.014 
(0.291) 


















∆ ∆ ∆ ∆NDEBT-4  -  -  -  0.001 
(0.753) 
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆REG  -6672.62  




(0.376)       
1266.3 
(0.447) 
D1992  -6598.2 
(0.252) 
-  -  - 
D1993  -8172.33  
(0.313)      
-341.289 
(0.727) 
-  - 
D1994  -7111.28 




(0.242)      
- 
D1995  -4518.52  




(0.885)      
611.234 
(0.484) 
D1996  -5532.19   




(0.562)       
1344.33 
(0.310) 
D1997  -7102.47 




(0.379)      
-789.462 
(0.517) 
D1998  -6621.28  
(0.270)      
293.021 
(0.824) 
913.786   
(0.215)     
1532.77 
(0.024) 
         
Sargan test  χ
2(39) =17.39   
          (0.999) 
χ
2(35) =23.74  
          (0.926) 
χ
2(29) = 19.45  
            (0.909) 
χ
2(21) =18.08  
          (0.644) 

















Next, I consider joint significant tests that will enable in the end conclusions 
in terms of Granger causality. The corresponding test are presented in table 
3. 
Table 3 
Joint significance tests 
 
Dependent variable: ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆NDEBT  Test 



































         
Dependent variable: ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆INV  Test 






































The inspection of table 3 indicates that in all cases overall joint significance 
prevails  for  the  totality  of  coefficients  (excluding  the  constant).  Moreover, 
joint significance prevails for the time dummies in the majority of the cases, 
 Next,  one  needs  to  select    a  configuration  for  the  lag  structure  before 
considering the causality tests. The joint significance tests of the coefficients 
of the  p-th lag favors p=2 for regressions in both directions. However, the 
results  are  robust  for  different  lags.  Essensiatlly  one  observes  that  past 
values of  ∆INV are significant in explaining ∆NDEBT whereas the reverse is 
not the case. The evidence thus indicate a uni-directional causality from INV to NDEBT and therefore is in part consistent with  a leverage effect and with 
the  notion  that  the  size  of  the  firm´s  investment  project  can  impose    a 
restriction on the amount of new debt.  
 
4.  Final Comments 
The paper aimed at investigating the relationship between regulation and 
the capital structure of the regulated firm. Causality tests were carried out 
between new debt (NBEDT) as proxied by change in long-term debt and 
investment  in  physical  capital  (INV)  as  proxied  by  change  in  gross 
communication plant. The evidence indicated a uni-directional causality from 
INV to NDEBT and therefore is consistent with a possibly relevant leverage 
effect.  The  result  is  sustained  whatever  regulatory  regime  prevails  at  the 
state level. It appears that even though traditional rate-of-return regulation 
regimes  are  more  strict  in  their  controls  than  more  flexible  regimes.  The 
paper  focused  on  the  change  in  debt  but  it  would  also  be  interesting  to 
investigate the issue  of new stock, though  the  related data  is not readily 
available. 
       The paper aimed at an initial empirical investigation of the topic but an 
ambitious and timely project would be the structural modelling that explicitly 
considers the role of asymmetric information. Empirical studies are still scarce 
and  include,  for  example, Wolak  (1994)  and  Gagnepain  and  Ivaldi  (2002). 
However, technologically dynamic sectors like telecommunications place an 
important challenge and structural investigations on the relationship between 
regulation and capital structure are still absent in the literature. Clearly it is not 
trivial to empirically disentangle leverage and signalling effects in terms of  a 
sound and meaningful theoretical framework.  References 
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